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Military Leadership by Intellectual Officers: A Case Study of the
IDF
Abstract
Morris Janowitz believed that for an army to be victorious it needs to be led by as many
intellectual forces as possible, just as any organization needs organizational intellectualism
to prosper. It is agreed in scholarly literature that the intellectual must author various
articles and manifestos to express their viewpoints, mindset, and philosophy in the public
sphere. Based on Janowitz’s belief and using the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as a case
study, this research offers a model for a generic research methodology that can be
practiced elsewhere. The mission was to find the extent to which the higher echelons of the
Israeli military engage in writing academic articles concerning matters of strategy and
army professionalism. Among other conclusions, the authors point out that, with certain
reservations considered, the number of articles authored by the IDF’s senior officers
proved to be low. If publication indeed reflects intellectualism, the few articles produced
over seven decades by the IDF’s leading echelon ought to sound a warning for Israel’s
military decision-makers.
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Introduction
Janowitz coined the term “intellectual officer” in 1964 by analyzing the
attitude within the ranks toward intellectualism.1 He claimed that in
the military profession, just like in any other profession, self-criticism
is essential to learn the right lessons and make effective changes.
Because the military profession is built on training and studying, there
ought to be a formal assessment of intellectual achievements. The
military commander should be prepared to use his intellectual abilities
to deal with the complex problems in front of him, where scientific
solutions are often required. Military planning must be fully accurate
because of its potential for destruction; therefore, intellectual effort is
valued as an advantageous tool for problem-solving.2
Using the IDF as a case study, this research seeks an understanding of
the intellectual environment that promotes the development of skillful
senior officers. Even some of the distinguished officers commemorated
in the museum at Fort Knox were not necessarily men with academic
virtues. George Patton is one example. He excelled in sports and
military drills from the early stages of his career, but scholarly
achievements were far from typical of him. Indeed, his academic
performance was average at best, and his speeches, though often
inspiring, were sometimes vulgar and controversial.3 Hence, wisdom
can emerge from other personal resources, and intellectualism is, to a
certain extent, an enigma. The basic assumption in this article is that
despite such unusual examples, in most cases academic qualities
correspond directly with intellectualism and that being a man of letters
is generally a prerequisite for richness of thought and strategic skills.
Considering this supposition, this article takes the IDF as a case study
to examine to what extent Israeli officers proved to be intellectual
officers.
This article starts with a review of works written about intellectualism,
with a particular focus on the military context. Relying on scholarly
literature, according to which authoring books and articles forms an
integral part of military intellectualism, Israel Tal is taken as an
example to discover the exact measures of intellectualism among the
Israeli army leadership in terms of published works in professional
military journals. The work refers to Major Generals and Chiefs of Staff
from 1948 to 2018 and examines what they printed and issued. The
examinations focused on Maarachot—the IDF’s leading professional
journal. Beyond the local investigation into the IDF, this research is an
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example for researchers to launch similar research studies into military
forces in other countries.

Intellectualism
Derived from the Latin intellectus, the word intellect means
understanding, common sense, and logic. The word intellectualism
expresses an attitude of appreciation of mind and thought as
representative of the highest level of adulthood, and an intellectual is a
person whose worldview is that of intellectualism and whose education
is based on thoughtfulness and intellect.
Aristotle’s interpretation of the intellectual aimed for an
uncompromising search for truth.4 Other scholars from various fields
have explained that the most characteristic trait of the intellectual is the
creation of new knowledge.5 In general, the common perception of an
intellectual is one who is always critical, has gained a reputation for
spiritual power in a particular field, and outlines what is right and
wrong for society. What seems most characteristic of the intellectual is
that their wisdom has no boundaries, and their lofty thoughts are not
necessarily limited to a specific earthly purpose.
In its broadest form, intellectualism, as Hofstadter defines it, is the
quest for an interplay of ideas and a philosophical application of
constructs, where the intellectual disregards any practical objective:
The intellectual relishes the play of the mind for its own sake
and finds in it one of the major values in life…. It is this
awareness of an available surplus beyond the requirements of
mere existence that his maxim conveys to us…. Whatever the
intellectual is too certain of, if he is healthily playful, he begins to
find unsatisfactory. The meaning of his intellectual life lies not in
the possession of truth but in the quest for new uncertainties.
Harold Rosenberg summed up this … when he said that the
intellectual is one who turns answers into questions.6
Hofstadter follows Aristotle’s definition between intellect and
intelligence, where the former primarily represents virtue,7 and asserts:
Whereas intelligence seeks to grasp, manipulate, re-order,
adjust, intellect examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes,
criticizes, imagines. Intelligence will seize the immediate
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meaning in a situation and evaluate it. Intellect evaluates
evaluations and looks for the meanings of situations as a whole.
Intelligence can be praised as a quality in animals; intellect,
being a unique manifestation of human dignity, is both praised
and assailed as a quality in men.8
However, this research understands intellectualism from a narrower
perspective, following most of the writings concerning organizational
intellectualism by early social and political scholars such as Joseph
Schumpeter or Charles Wright Mills.9 Organizational intellectualism
narrows intellectualism to the area where the organization’s conceptual
and practical development takes place to achieve various goals while
expanding the organization’s boundaries. In this sense, the military is
just like any other organization, and military intellectualism, for that
matter, is a form of organizational intellectualism.10
It is widely believed that intellectualism is one of the cornerstones of
the knowledge creation process. Organizational intellectualism is the
factor that produces and enhances knowledge in the organization, and
that makes an important contribution to the success or failure of the
organization.11 The importance of intellectualism in the army,
therefore, is vastly magnified since its success or failure is linked to
costs or gains in terms of life and death. This is the major reason
discourse about military intellectualism is so important. All this
corresponds, of course, with the seminal works of Janowitz.12
In 1976 Dixon analyzed some glorious military failures, such as the
Crimean War, the Battle of Cambrai, and Operation Garden Market.13
He searched for the reasons for these failures and wondered if the low
mental level of the commanders, not to say their stupidity, could supply
us with a satisfactory explanation. Dixon’s insight is that these things
are much more complex. There is no doubt that the decision-making
process that is a key part of the military is a mental process, and the
higher the mental abilities of the commander, the better his decisions
are on the battlefield. However, Dixon’s conclusions from the examples
he analyzed were that one’s character and feelings influence the
decision-making process, often not for the better. For example, Dixon
points out the potentially devastating influence of the tendency to
impersonate someone who is never mistaken—and accordingly, to take
unnecessary risks.14 These psychological pitfalls can be overcome by
developing the military leader’s intellect, preparing him for the risky
situations he is bound to face at one point or another.
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This article focuses solely on the level of individual military leaders who
have controlled an army. Nevertheless, the senior army staff has not
always favored military intellectualism. In the United Kingdom, for
example, the officers’ attitude toward military service, until the period
between the two World Wars, was one of utmost respect for physical
courage and field sports skills—and at the same time, of disrespect for
army professionalism and professional military education.
Their traditions were against books and study and in favor of a
hard gallop, a gallant fight, and a full jug. … The preference for
character over intellect, for brawn over brain, has always taken
the form of denigration of the staff college graduate and
apotheosis of that splendid chap, the regimental officer.15
In France, things were no different. For instance, Paddy Griffith
asserted that too much intellectualism was considered on a par with
being on leave for reasons of illness or insanity.16 French Marshal
Patrice de MacMahon, whose Armée de Châlons was defeated at the
Battle of Sedan in 1870, took the matter one step further, announcing
that he would erase from his promotion list officers whose names were
printed as authors on the covers of any books.17 It is not surprising,
therefore, that Robert Doughty describes the failure of intellect as one
of the major reasons for the devastating failure of French forces against
the German blitzkrieg.18
Across the Atlantic Ocean things were the same. In 1890, U.S. naval
officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan published The Influence of
Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, to be followed two years later by
The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,
1793–1812.19 Mahan’s books are often compared to Carl von
Clausewitz’s 1832 On War,20 and Mahan is frequently referred to as the
most significant American author of the nineteenth century. However,
his commander, Admiral Francis Munroe Ramsay, reacted to Mahan’s
works by asserting that writing books was not part of a naval officer’s
job.21 Similarly, in 1914, U.S. Army Chief of Staff Major General
Leonard Wood ordered that military education and training should be
confined solely to practical preparation for war—and that, accordingly,
books should not be used except as reference material.22
In November 1920, a young officer, Dwight Eisenhower, published an
article about the promising future of the tank, the armored vehicle that
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had been introduced in warfare only four years earlier. Subsequently,
Major General Charles Farnsworth publicly scolded him, claiming that
Eisenhower’s ideas were not only wrong but also dangerous. In fact, he
threatened that if the young officer ever wrote anything again that
contradicted the well-established infantry doctrine—he would have him
court-martialed. This whole chain of events should come as no surprise
considering that Farnsworth was not only Chief of Infantry but also the
American General who had established the U.S. Army Infantry School.
What is surprising, however, is that decades later, after having
completed his military career as distinguished Chief of Staff,
Eisenhower recounted his experience in WWII:
We had so many wisecracking so-called intellectuals going
around and showing how wrong everybody was who didn’t
happen to agree with them. By the way, [an intellectual is] a man
who takes more words than are necessary to tell more than he
knows.23
Just’s explanation of why the American army never raised a Clausewitz
of its own should be seen in this context. Authoring a book like On
War, Just asserts, takes time and brooding over things; all this is too
time-consuming and depressing for the American officer.24 The antiintellectual attitude did not remain something that belonged to a
distant past. In 1997, Colonel Douglas Macgregor raised new ideas on
modern ground warfare, calling for the formation of small units—
independent, agile, and mobile—on armored vehicles equipped with
light weapons.25 However, Macgregor’s concept did not fit with the
thinking of his senior officers. It took five years and 9/11 for the
military to change its views and alter its power structure.26 These
examples suggest that although armed forces formally support
intellectualism, and despite a growing awareness of the need for an
intellectual officer, there is also a cultural bias against it.
Unlike military professionalism, manifested by the proper application
of knowledge, the essence of military intellectualism is learning and
gaining the insight required by intellectual effort in order to defeat the
enemy. The authors of this study adopted the concept that the
knowledge derived from an intellectual approach is of the kind that
extends and upgrades military professionalism.
Examples of such knowledge include new theories and martial arts,
innovative technological ideas, developed theories and new inventions
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that ought to be fitted to various circumstances, and a framework for
learning and drawing conclusions. In sum, military intellectualism is
purposeful and focused on the military profession. The core of military
intellectualism is the understanding that an intellectual approach is
needed to overcome the nation’s rivals. Military intellectualism
embodies the necessity of education, particularly in military theory and
history, which fosters success in the military profession. Intellectualism
assists in acquiring knowledge and in promoting achievement,
especially in complex planning and problem-solving. Criticism, mainly
self-criticism, is an essential component of military intellectualism as
an engine for learning lessons and correcting mistakes. This process
results in the creation of knowledge, reflected in new practical wisdom,
theories, practices, and sometimes military reforms.27
The object of an army is to win its wars, and there is no solid proof that
military intellectualism is a necessary condition for such results. In
fact, within the numerous causal variables that affect battles, some
essential factors have no connection whatsoever with commanders’
intellectualism.28 However, this research follows the significance that
scholars of military affairs gave intellectualism mainly because it is
hard to ignore the importance of intellect in developing technology.
Technology supports revolution in military affairs (RMA), a factor that
has an enormous impact on military victories.29
Beyond the numerous historical case studies, there is also relatively
new evidence for the importance of technological advances. In the
2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which
ended with an Azerbaijani victory, the Armenian army was initially
superior to its Azerbaijani rival, with better officers and highly
motivated soldiers. However, Azerbaijan’s innovative use of drones and
Armenia’s lack of appropriate preventive radar systems isolated the
Armenian forces and enabled the Azerbaijanis to destroy them.30 There
is also the example of the 2022 battles between Ukraine and Russia,
where agile Western weapons proved their capacity to defeat large
conventionally armed forces when Ukrainian stingers,31 javelins,32
NLAWs,33 and drones defeated the invading Russian force.34
The intellectual officer is a professional officer who is not content with
the knowledge he has gained and the operational experience he has
accumulated but is looking for ways to expand the limits of the military
profession in order to defeat the enemy. His approach to the military
profession in the areas of development, planning, and problem-solving
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is intellectual. He assumes that the enemy in front of him has
operational experience and education just like him; therefore, it takes
intellectual effort over time to locate the opponent’s weak points.
Discovering one’s rival’s weaknesses requires some “out of the box”
thinking and creativity to find the right way to surprise the enemy. The
intellectual officer possesses the qualities of an officer who brings the
intellectual dimension to his position while adapting it to the special
needs of the profession. He sees himself first as a soldier, and his
intellectuality, in his view, complements his personality and constitutes
an integral part of what makes him a person.35
Kober’s description of the intellectual officer includes professionalism,
which involves the application of knowledge; the basic knowledge
required for an officer is a combination of military theory and military
history. However, intellectualism means that knowledge in itself is
insufficient; the intellectual officer is obliged to adapt and make use of
contemporary challenges and realities. The examples he mentions are
Frederick the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, Helmuth von Moltke, Alfred
von Schlieffen, John Frederick Charles “Boney” Fuller, and Norman
Schwarzkopf.36
Frederick Hayek, Nobel Laureate for Economics, pointed out the link
between intellectualism and writing as early as 1949. Hayek
distinguished between the specialist, who is an in-depth scholar in his
narrow and practical field, and the intellectual, who acts in the public
sphere in broad areas of interest that he expresses in speech and
writing. The expert scholar is dedicated to knowledge of his own needs,
whereas the intellectual’s interest is to act in the context of the
community at large—in speech and in writing.37 Cohen describes the
important—even indispensable—role of intellectuals in the process of
the political revolution, in leadership, in ideology, and in writing
manifestos.38 Williams describes and analyzes the progression in
platforms used by the intellectual who expresses himself publicly—from
small journals that deal with criticism and literary studies, to scholarly
periodicals that deal primarily with history, and finally to journals that
focus on political theory.39
In sum, the intellectual, including, of course, the organizational and the
military intellectual, must write various articles or manifestos in order
to express his viewpoints, his mindset, and his philosophies in the
public sphere. Publishing one’s insights, writing descriptions of various
concepts and issuing them in journals where original thoughts are
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distributed and circulated publicly form an integral part of being an
intellectual.

Intellectualism in the IDF
Since the creation of the IDF, it has constantly been active—in wars,
operations, and local battles between rounds of war and low-intensity
warfare. The IDF has generally done well, certainly when Israel
defeated rival armies in its existential wars (in 1948, 1967, and, some
would add, 1973). However, since the 1980s and the development of an
asymmetric military situation where Israel faces Hezbollah, Hamas,
and the PLO in the surrounding territories, there is a feeling that the
IDF has been failing to exhaust its power, make use of its advantages,
and defeat its enemies.40
The national security and defense doctrine, created and developed in
1953 by David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, saw the
principle of quality as the ultimate answer to the quantitative
asymmetry from which Israel suffered.41 The idea of quality can easily
be interpreted in the Israeli reality of the twenty-first century as
achieving military goals as quickly as possible, at the lowest possible
price, by using brainwaves and innovation—in short, by practicing an
intellectual approach. This encompasses knowledge implementation,
lessons learned, and production of know-how. Technological
superiority, ever so essential in modern warfare, can be achieved
through this approach. Indeed, this is how the IDF’s martial theory
defines intellectualism:
An attitude whereby the commander and the military recognize
the importance of knowledge of military teachings and military
history and use them in combination with applied and practical
reason, but avoid any vain bargaining of theory. The
development of intellectual ability has two main components:
the creation of a broad knowledge base and the development of
skills.42
Since the 1979 peace treaties with Egypt and the 1994 settlement with
Jordan, quantitative asymmetry has been reversed in favor of Israel,
and the ethos of the few facing the many has dissipated. However, a
different kind of asymmetry emerged in the behavioral realm. Some of
Israel’s enemies do not accept the common rules and norms of warfare
and deliberately choose the civilian sphere as an arena for their armed
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struggle. This behavior appears in military activity within a civilian
population, using non-combatants as human shields and firing at
civilian targets.43 The difficult challenges that this behavioral
asymmetry presents to the IDF, as an army that belongs to a society
that is committed to democratic norms and human rights, require the
use of the quality principle—that is, the use of military intellect.
Criticism over the lack of intellectualism within the armed forces
started as early as the days of the Palmach (the Jewish community’s
underground elite fighting units during the period of the British
Mandate over Palestine). The major claim of the critics was that the
Palmach relied on its accumulated military experience, while they
ignored universal well-known military principles and refused to absorb
military common knowledge. This criticism continued after 1948 with
the formation of the IDF, where Israeli officers were often accused of
heedless attitudes toward their own army’s martial theory.44 Indeed,
the IDF’s military culture often preferred its own short-lived historical
experience—and even more so, improvisation—to well-established
sources of military theory.45 This assertion was also made in some of
the inquiry commissions set up after various wars. For example, the
Agranat Commission, appointed by the Israeli government to
investigate the circumstances that led to the outbreak of the 1973 War,
asserted, among many other conclusions:
Among the officer’s corps of the IDF, most of the ranks do not
read any professional literature, show no process of professional
educational development, and are not up-to-date at all about
military professional advance either within the IDF or in other
armies.46
In a damning report released by IDF Colonel Emanuel Wald,47 certain
developments within the Israeli army are described, pointing out that
military intellectualism declined. The IDF expanded significantly after
the 1973 War, with an increase of 50 percent in commission ranks until
1982. The immediate need for commanders drew into the
organization’s mediocre officers. Promotion to the rank of colonel
became almost automatic, regardless of any of the officers’
accomplishments or failures. Soon, the new generation of captains,
majors, and even colonels learned that the most important thing in
their career was not achieving goals but staying as much as possible out
of trouble. Furthermore, a vast majority of the increase in ranks was
within the military administration, forming inefficient parallel
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bureaucratic headquarters, where the leading principle was the lack of
any clear strategy. Consequently, improvisation became the norm
among highly ranked officers, and getting along turned out to be the
epitome of success. In such an atmosphere, an anti-professional
orientation developed, and where professionalism was not appreciated,
organizational intellectualism was shunned, and an academic mentality
was avoided.48
The connection between lack of organizational intellectualism in the
Israeli army and military failure was also at the core of the report given
by the Winograd Commission, the governmental commission of inquiry
chaired by Judge Eliyahu Winograd, appointed to review the
preparation and conduct of Israeli military operations during the 2006
war against Hezbollah.49
Notably, there is a specific institute within the IDF, the Dado Center,
also known as MALTAM (the Hebrew acronym for the Institute for the
Study of Campaigns). It was established during the mid-1990s by a
group of brigadier generals who also completed their Ph.D. studies in
military history and political science. One of them was Brigadier
General Dr. Shimon Naveh, labeled by his Tel Aviv University students
“Michel Foucault on steroids.”50 Naveh drew on Soviet operational art
ideas and the complex systems theory approach and noticed four
milestones in the development of campaign theory:
1. The military thought of the nineteenth century;
2. The blitzkrieg;
3. The Soviet campaign theory of the first half of the twentieth
century;
4. The American integrated campaign theory used in the Gulf
War.51
Despite some criticism of the IDF for neglecting its commitment to
professionalism by refraining from maintaining intellectual
frameworks, MALTAM is living proof that constant intellectual work
has been ongoing within the ranks. Two of its outstanding students
were Brigadier General Gal Hirsh, who took a dominant part in the
2006 War in Lebanon, and Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi—today,
the Chief of Staff. Nowadays, MALTAM is commanded full-time by a
brigadier general, and its staff includes high-ranking, experienced
officers alongside scholars in the fields of psychology, philosophy,
political science, sociology, communications, and economics. Some of
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the IDF’s successes are considered to have resulted from ideas and
theories developed within MALTAM. The 2002 large-scale campaign—
the largest military operation, in fact, in the territories since the 1967
War, which eventually stopped terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians, was
inspired to a considerable extent by some of the concepts designed in
MALTAM.52
Hence, unable to choose between the position of the IDF’s critics, who
claim that there is not enough intellectualism among its leading
officers, and that of the IDF’s other observers, who praise its proven
abilities—and on the grounds that publishing is one of the main factors
that characterize intellectual officers—this article aims to find the
extent to which the higher echelons of the Israeli military are engaged
in writing articles in academic level concerning matters of strategy and
army professionalism.

Maarachot as an Intellectual Platform
In 1939, Ben Gurion founded Maarachot to provide professional and
political education to the Jewish security forces in British Mandate
Palestine. At the time of its establishment, these forces still constituted
an underground organization, IDF’s historical ancestor. Additionally,
the aim was to signal to the world that a new generation of Jews in
Israel was now engaged in military thought. The first issue was
published in September 1939, with the outbreak of World War II. In an
interview on the 70th anniversary of the journal, Editor-in-Chief Hagai
Golan asserted that the uniqueness of Maarachot lay in its ability to
bridge concepts from the various professional units dedicated to
entirely different military tasks. It is a platform where readers from
diverse troops can be exposed to the knowledge of other army units and
find inspiration for unconventional ideas and creative thinking. Thus,
Maarachot forms a framework for augmenting the toolbox with which
officers tackle their tasks.53 It should come as no surprise, then, that
one study has asserted that there are three major reasons why
Maarachot could be considered the ultimate intellectual platform:
•
•
•

The articles reflect the intellectual traits of the
commissioned staff and their professional curiosity;
The articles are accessible to a wide audience;
The journal has been published regularly since 1939,
distributing articles about official military thought in Israel.
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Hence, the journal started even before the IDF was formed, and its
authors observed developments over a span of decades in real time and
retroactively.54
Others have already examined Maarachot as a hotbed of flourishing
intellectual activity.55 However, whereas these were conducted at a
group level, that is, they aimed at evaluating its overall intellectual
input, this research focuses on specific authors, more precisely, on the
senior officers of the IDF.
It should be noted that MALTAM publishes another important journal,
Bein Haktavim, which features senior officers from various ranks,
including Major Generals and a Chief of Staff. However, the numbers
are too small for any inquiry; only 18 volumes, comprising 119 articles,
were issued throughout the journal’s four years of existence within the
timeframe of this research (2014-2018).
Other military journals were also excluded from this research because,
despite their existence within the military public sphere, their essence
is irrelevant to the search for intellectualism. These journals belong to
different arms of the IDF—the armored corps, artillery, intelligence, air
force, navy, and others. Its goals are to maintain morale and
atmosphere and, sometimes, to highlight the legacies of various battles,
but rarely to hold academic discussions.

Findings
The sample for this research was 225 Major Generals and 22 Chiefs of
Staff across the years 1948 to 2018. The sample did not include retired
officers. In the IDF, officers retire on average at 43 years of age, leaving
them the ability to conduct a second career. Some of them develop
academic professions, either in universities or in certain research
institutes where military knowledge is needed. Hence, many write
analyses on security topics, published by organizations such as the
Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, the Jerusalem Institute for
Strategy and Security, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and
the Institute for National Security Studies. Since this research aims to
examine intellectualism within the armed forces, retired officers were
excluded from the analysis.
The corpus for this investigation was 437 issues of Maarachot, which
included 5,797 articles. Of these, 414 were found to be relevant to this
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research. Table 1 portrays the distribution of articles written by 247
Major Generals and Chiefs of Staff.
Table 1. Chiefs of Staff and Major Generals’ Publications in Maarachot
Total articles reviewed

5,795

100.00%

Written by Chief of Staff

151

2.61%

Written by Major General

263

4.54%

Total

414

7.14%

Source: Authors’ research.

As shown in Table 1, although Chiefs of Staff form only 8.9 percent of
the senior officers, their share in the number of articles authored by
officers is 36.5 percent. This means that, broadly speaking, Chiefs of
Staff have four times as many publications as generals.
The data was collected and then categorized according to the topics of
the articles. An analysis of this categorization found that the articles
focused on three main topics: military history, military theory and
doctrine, and daily routine. Table 2 illustrates the distribution of these
topics
Table 2. Chiefs of Staff and Major Generals—Segmenting by Article Classification
Number of Publications

Military History

Military Theory

Daily routine

151
100%
263
100%

32
21.2%
66
25.1%

47
31.1%
136
51.7%

414

98

100%

23.7%

Chief of Staff
Major General
Total

Total

Other

21
13.9%
52
19.8%

100
66.2%
254
96.6%

51
33.8%
9
3.4%

183

73

354

60

44.2%

17.6%

85.5%

14.5%

Source: Authors’ research.

Table 2 illustrates military theory is the leading topic for senior officers
since 44.2 percent of their publications are on this subject. Military
history is second, at 23.7 percent, and the topic of current affairs makes
up 17.6 percent. However, generals are significantly stronger than
Chiefs of Staff on all three topics (since a larger portion of the writings
by Chiefs of Staff pertains to subjects that are not among the leading
ones). Major Generals write more about military theory than Chiefs of
Staff, scoring 51.7 percent compared to 31.1 percent.
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The next step was a double examination of the data using group-based
analysis as well as individual-based analysis. This comprised a
calculation of the number of articles for each officer during his military
career, assuming such a career to be 30 years long, on average, then a
calculation of the number of articles for each officer divided by 30
years, and in this way created the authoring index. This index indicates
a relative level of articles authored for each officer.
To estimate intellectualism according to the authoring index, the
authors interviewed three IDF reserves high-ranking officers who have
fulfilled leading military roles and once their army service ended, they
turned to academic careers. Reserve officers were asked about their
expectations concerning the number of articles an intellectual officer
should publish throughout his military service, and consequently, the
frequency of these publications. Based on the answers provided in the
interviews, one article every four years can be considered an
intellectual gold standard for publishing in the journal.
Therefore, the gold standard according to the authoring index in this
research is 0.25. Any result beyond this index indicates an intellectual
tendency, and any result below it indicates a lack of an intellectual
tendency. Notably, this is a qualitative dimension of this research since
it relies on the personal views of the senior officers interviewed. The
methodological model presented here is generic; different expectations
for the frequency of publishing articles will automatically lead to other
intellectual gold standards. This research can easily be replicated in the
IDF and can set an example for similar studies in other armies. The
gold standard of the authoring index will always depend on the
historical and cultural circumstances of the investigated military force.
Table 3 illustrates the numbers and percentages of senior officers
whose authoring index exceeded the value of 0.25 (that is, at least one
publication every four years on average).
Table 3. The Number of Officers that Meet the Intellectual Gold Standard
Number

Publications

Percent

Chiefs of Staff

22

8

36.4%

Major Generals

225

7

3.1%

Total

247

15

6.1%

Source: Authors’ research.

Table 3 illustrates that only a small portion of the officers, 6.1 percent,
stand up to the gold standard. Chiefs of Staff, although they are only
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8.9 percent of the senior officers of the sample, form more than half of
the officers who meet the gold standard—53.3 percent. Whereas almost
none of the Major Generals reach the 0.25 authoring index (only 3.1
percent), over one-third of the Chiefs of Staff, 36.4 percent, achieve
this.
It is clear, then, that Chiefs of Staff in the IDF, despite their low
number, perform much better than Major Generals. In light of this
finding, a percentile analysis was performed to obtain a general
overview. Table 4 provides the results of this analysis.
Table 4. Chiefs of Staff—Percentile Analysis of Authored Articles
Number of Publications

Percentile

Number of Chiefs of Staff

Percentile

52

34.4%

2

9.1%

97

64.2%

5

22.7%

128

84.8%

9

40.9%

151

100.0%

17

77.3%

0

0.0%

5

22.7%

22

100.0%

Source: Authors’ research.

Table 4 illustrates the encouraging numbers that show the excellence of
Chiefs of Staff in article authoring. Only two Chiefs of Staff (9.1
percent) were responsible for over a third of the academic production
by Chiefs of Staff. Five other Chiefs of Staff (who form over a fifth of the
army’s top leadership, 22.7 percent)—more than twice the number of
productive Chiefs of Staff—have not authored a single article.
This calls, of course, for an equivalent examination among the Major
General ranks. Hence, Table 5 provides the figures that are relevant for
that group.
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Table 5. Major Generals—Percentile Analysis of Authored Articles
Number of Publications

Percentile

Number of Major Generals

Percentile

54

20.5%

3

1.3%

99

37.6%

7

3.1%

149

56.7%

16

7.1%

199

75.7%

31

13.8%

230

87.5%

46

20.4%

255

97.0%

71

31.6%

263

100.00%

79

35.1%

0

0.0%

146

64.9%

225

100.0%

Source: Authors’ research.

In the case of Major Generals, overall productivity is significantly less
than that of their commanders, the group of Chiefs of Staff, but the
burden distribution seems to be more even.
Since this article measured the intellectual productiveness of the IDF’s
senior officers across a timeframe of 70 years, it was deemed worth
checking how article authoring has also changed over time. Table 6
shows the change in the overall publication of articles in Maarachot
throughout the seven decades examined in this research.
Table 6. Chiefs of Staff and Major Generals—Number of Articles Published per Decade
Decade

Total

From

To

Number

1948
1959
1969
1979
1989
1999
2009

1958
1968
1978
1988
1998
2008
2018

1,287
1,353
711
547
366
683
847
5,794

Yearly
Average
128.7
135.3
71.1
54.7
36.6
68.3
84.7
82.8

By Major General
Yearly
Number
Average
36
3.6
37
3.7
17
1.7
48
4.8
32
3.2
54
5.4
40
3.6
264
3.73

Percent
2.80%
2.73%
2.39%
8.78%
8.74%
7.91%
4.72%
4.56%

By Chief of Staff
Yearly
Number
Average
23
2.3
52
5.2
35
3.5
12
1.2
12
1.2
10
1.0
7
0.7
151
2.40

Percent
1.79%
3.84%
4.92%
2.19%
3.28%
1.46%
0.83%
2.61%

Source: Authors’ research.

The first important fact that one can learn from the table is that the
overall numbers, and consequently the yearly average of publications in
Maarachot, drop significantly and consistently over the first five
decades. After a small decrease in the number of publications during
the 1960s compared to the 1950s, the number of articles dropped
dramatically during the 1970s. This trend continued until the low point
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in the 1990s of less than a third (28.4 percent) of the production of
1959-1968. Afterward, during the 2000s, there was an interesting
recovery in the number of articles published. This is a noteworthy
trend, although it is not necessarily directly connected with the present
examination of article authorship by senior officers.
The percentage of articles written by Major Generals changed over the
decades, starting from a low of 2.8 percent and increasing to a high of
8.78 percent during the 1980s. This situation remained much the same
over the next three decades. Finally, despite the drop to 4.72 percent,
the endpoint for this group in the sample is still significantly higher
than the starting point.
The percentage of articles in the journal written by Chiefs of Staff also
changes through the seven decades, starting low (1.79 percent) in the
1950s, multiplying and rising during the 1960s and 1970s (3.84 percent
and 4.92 percent, respectively), and then dropping by half during the
1980s (2.19 percent). However, perhaps the most interesting drift here
is the downward trend since the 1990s, with 3.28 percent decreasing to
1.46 percent during the 2000s and then all the way down to 0.83
percent over the last decade.
Accordingly, the proportion of publications by Major Generals to those
by Chiefs of Staff has transformed dramatically over the years. During
the first decade, Major Generals scored higher than Chiefs of Staff and
produced more articles (36 versus 23). However, this changed during
the 1960s and 1970s, with a recovery in the numbers produced by the
Chiefs of Staff. Yet the great transformation started during the 1980s,
and ever since then, there seems to have been a steady reduction in the
number of articles published by the Chiefs of Staff. Their part of the
total number of articles published by Maarachot has diminished to just
0.83 percent, constituting far less than a fifth of the performance by the
Major Generals. (To be exact—17.6 percent represents the proportion of
articles published that decade by Chiefs of Staff [7] to those published
by Major Generals [40].)
The two outstanding Chiefs of Staff who authored more articles than
any of the other senior generals were Yitzhak Rabin and Haim Laskov.
Rabin started his military career as a teenager when he joined the ranks
of the Palmach, and he advanced quickly, proving to be an outstanding
commander during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. He directed operations
and commanded the forces in some bitter battles in Jerusalem; he
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fought the Egyptian army in the south; he was in charge, later, of the
largest operation to that point, which involved—for the first time—
entire IDF brigades. Rabin took an active part in shaping the training
doctrine of the IDF during the early 1950s, and he led the IDF’s
Operation Directorate from 1959 to 1963. In 1964 he was appointed
Chief of Staff and masterminded Israel’s decisive victory over Egypt,
Jordan, and Syria in 1967.56
Laskov joined the Haganah—the Jewish underground in Palestine—as
a teenager and was among the first volunteers of the Palmach. In 1940,
he joined the British Army to participate in World War II. He served in
various capacities and was a commander of the Jewish Brigade, which
eventually fought on the Italian front. He reached the rank of Major.
After the war, he remained in Europe to participate in the illegal Jewish
immigration effort to bring Holocaust survivors to Palestine. Upon
returning to Palestine, he rejoined the Haganah. During the 1948
Arab-Israeli War, Laskov assumed responsibility for preparing the
framework for training new recruits. He organized the first officers’
course and formed the graduates into a full-scale active fighting brigade
of which he was the commander. By the end of that war, he was a Major
General. Although he had never been a pilot, Laskov was appointed
commander of the Israeli Air Force in 1951. During his tenure, the air
force prepared to incorporate its first jet fighter. Upon completing his
tenure in 1953, Laskov left the army to study philosophy, economics,
and political science in the United Kingdom. He also obtained
additional military training there. In 1958, shortly after returning to
Israel, he assumed office as the IDF’s fifth Chief of Staff. During his
term, he focused on building the army’s strength. Israel acquired its
first submarine and its first jets. Notably, Laskov established Israel’s
National Defense College, which he believed would promote the IDF
generals’ fluency in strategic concepts.57

Conclusion
This article’s point of departure was that for an army to be victorious it
needs to be led by as many intellectual forces as possible. Just like any
organization needs organizational intellectualism to prosper, the army
too needs military intellectualism to overcome its rivalry with other
armed forces. There are various tools to measure intellectualism, from
IQ tests to the count of years of academic studies that the various
officers experienced. This research sought to measure one dimension of
military intellectualism: the number of articles published by senior
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officers. While presenting a model of a generic research methodology
that can easily be practiced elsewhere, this research’s primary mission
was to determine the extent to which the IDF can be considered an
army that is led by intellectual generals.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first attempt to
construct a measurement of the intellectual productiveness of IDF’s
senior personnel. As such, one important reservation must be stated:
the supposition that publications can serve as the main indicator of
military intellectualism can be somewhat erroneous. As clandestine
organizations, militaries might have other forms to express
intellectualism—perhaps even written forms—but not necessarily
publications in open media. With this in mind, and the limitation of
using one open journal, the present results must be taken with a grain
of salt. Despite this, the results lead to conclusions that point out trends
and indicate tendencies, leading to a comprehension of a certain
organizational state of mind within the ranks of the IDF.
The first conclusion is that the number of articles authored by the IDF’s
senior officers is quite low. Out of nearly six thousand articles
published since the establishment of the Israeli army, slightly over four
hundred were authored by its generals. If publication reflects
intellectualism, as the writers of this research assumed, then lack of
publication might reflect the opposite. If such is the case, then the fact
that so few articles were produced over the course of seven decades by
the IDF’s highest echelon ought to be a warning to Israel’s military
decision-makers.
At this stage of its 70-year history, the IDF has entered, like many other
armies worldwide, an era when computerized systems, even cyber
warfare, form a fundamental platform for every military development.
The current trends of RMA are tied to modern information technology,
telecommunications, and space technology.58 These tend to transform
military command into the management of professional noncombatants, where little knowledge of specific fields is demanded from
the army leader. Another reservation concerning this conclusion is that
this article’s focus was on publication by officers, there are other
dimensions of intellectualism that can be measured, like education or
organizational reform initiatives, and these—when measured—may
bring about different results and different conclusions.
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A second conclusion refers to the distribution of published articles
between different groups of highly ranked officers. Within the relatively
small number of publications, there was a strange proportion between
the numbers of articles published by each group of senior officers. The
share of Chiefs of Staff, although they are a small minority, far exceeds
the contribution of the Major Generals. This could indicate that to
become a Chief of Staff in the IDF, one ought to be more of an
intellectual. Perhaps the fact that certain Major Generals were
intellectual officers—and authored articles accordingly—was the reason
behind their promotions. However, a deeper look into the distribution
of the number of articles authored by the Chiefs of Staff reveals that
two of them were responsible for over a third of the publications.
Furthermore, well over a fifth of them did not publish even one article.
Validating the connection between publishing and military
intellectualism is beyond the scope of this article. However, looking
into the life story of each of these two commanders confirms that a
direct connection does occur.
An authoring index was calculated to estimate intellectualism as
accurately as possible by totaling the number of articles published and
dividing this by 30 (the average number of years of military service
among senior officers). Based on the judgment of three former highranking officers, the intellectual gold standard of the authoring index
was established to be at least 0.25, that is, one article every four years.
The results obtained in this research indicate that the gold standard is
far above the productivity of the vast majority of the IDF’s Major
Generals and Chiefs of Staff. This is indeed a poor result that confirms
the bad shape of intellectualism among the senior ranks of the IDF.
The final check was a longitudinal one to look at the data from a
historical point of view, following the tendencies regarding publication
in Maarachot over the course of seven decades. The major finding was
a consistent decrease in publications by Chiefs of Staff. Whereas Major
Generals maintained throughout the years their portions of article
writing, the writings of their superiors diminished and practically
disappeared, with a score of only seven articles during the last decade
under examination. Indeed, this is unwelcome news for anyone who
expected the IDF to further intellectualism through authoring academic
articles. However, the accelerating nature of RMA, particularly during
recent decades, is an important contextual factor in this regard.59
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Yitzhak Rabin and Haim Laskov, who authored far more articles than
any other highly ranked IDF officer, have been discussed, but it is
necessary to consider another outstanding officer: Major General Israel
Tal. Throughout history, there have been heroes and leaders who
fought brilliantly and—whether winning or losing—demonstrated
skillful warfare tactics and strategies. However, few earned worldwide
acknowledgment for their influence on martial theory and the design of
modern battlefields. These contributions, such as new technologies,
were sparked mainly by way of thinking. Novelty and innovation have
always been inspired by philosophy and scholarly development. Tal is
one such innovator; indeed, his name is engraved at the Patton
Museum in Fort Knox as one of the five great armored corps officers
(alongside George Patton, Erwin Rommel, Creighton Abrams, and
Moshe Peled).
Major General Tal, popularly known as Talik, joined the British army at
the age of 18 during World War II, where he fought with the Jewish
Brigade on the Italian front. Once the war ended, he joined the
Hagana, the Jewish underground in British Mandate Palestine. By the
time the IDF was formed, he was already an experienced officer. During
the 1967 campaign, he led the 84th Division, which conquered the
northern axis in Sinai, from Gaza and El-Arish all the way to the Suez
Canal. Tal also developed the cylinder bridge—used by the IDF to cross
the Suez Canal during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when he was Deputy
Chief of Staff. After the official end of the war, he received an order to
attack Egyptian forces. Tal refused to follow the order, insisting that it
was unethical, and he demanded authorization from the Prime Minister
and the Supreme Court. Such an authorization never came. His stance
cost him the position of Chief of Staff, so in 1974 at age 50, he retired
from the military and joined the Strategic Research Centre at Tel Aviv
University. In 1978, Tal returned to military service to develop a new
organizational plan: the establishment of a field-forces command.
Tal coined the phrase “the man in the tank shall win,” a slogan that has
become the reflection of the IDF’s armored corps’ doctrine. He was an
example not only of a general who led the forces on the battlefield but
also of a military leader who published quite a few articles, shaped the
armor fighting theory in the IDF, and influenced a whole generation of
combatants and their commanders.60
Tal’s professional capabilities were of the kind that the IDF, like any
army, yearns for. Indeed, he represents the type of officer that every
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army wishes to raise and nourish: an officer who is a leader in combat—
but also one who knows how to construct army doctrines, shape
strategic planning, and establish a military school of thought.
It seems that in order to establish military intellectualism within the
ranks of the IDF, there is an urgent need for more leaders like Rabin
and Laskov, referring to how these two proved their intellectualism by
combining successful command over victorious military forces with
publishing many professional articles. Certainly, an intellectual IDF
should be able to raise more military leaders like Major General Israel
Tal. When a governmental decision was made in 1970 to develop an
Israeli tank to reduce reliance on foreign aid, Tal was appointed to head
the project, which is considered one of the greatest successes of Israel’s
military industry. It is no wonder, then, that he won the Israel Defense
Prize. One of the basic claims of this research is that its measurements
support the hypothesis that armies that want to cope with the tensions
of the twenty-first century, and the IDF in particular, should do their
utmost to encourage within its ranks more generals like Major General
Israel Tal and some of his colleagues commemorated at Fort Knox. The
issue remains, however, that there is an apparent shortage of highranking intellectual officers, as indicated by the small number of
publications. This is an essential research question for follow-up
studies.
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